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Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: Due Process 
Concerns, Probable Consequences, and Possible 
Solutions∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early one morning in November 2003, Mr. Humberto “Bert” 
Fernandez-Vargas said goodbye to his family and drove to the U.S. 
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS)1 office in Salt 
Lake City, Utah.2  Fernandez-Vargas appeared at the BCIS office 
expecting a routine interview regarding his pending application for 
permanent residence.3  However, instead of attending an interview that 
would move him one step closer to attaining lawful permanent residence 
inside the United States, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested for being in the 
country illegally and detained until his removal could be finalized.4  On 
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 1. The BCIS was an agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that 
replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  On November 1, 2003, the BCIS was 
replaced by the USCIS—the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—within the DHS. 
 2. Dennis Romboy, Outcast in Mexico, Outlaw in Utah, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake 
City, Utah), Oct. 9, 2005, at A01. 
 3. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A]pparently at an 
interview regarding his application, Fernandez was arrested for being in the country illegally.”), aff’d 
sub nom Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006).  “Lawful permanent residence” 
refers to a foreign national’s visa status.  A person who is a permanent resident is allowed to reside 
indefinitely within the United States as an immigrant, despite not having U.S. citizenship.  See 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2000) (defining “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence”).  Lawful permanent residents are also commonly referred to as 
“green card holders.”  See Ernest R. Larkins, Coming to America: International Students Face a 
Labyrinth of Income Tax Issues, 15 CONN. J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2000) (“Permanent immigrants are 
sometimes called green card holders since years ago the card’s color was green.”). 
 4. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427.  Prior to 1996, “noncitizens who were found to be 
‘inadmissible,’ and who did not receive discretionary relief, were ‘excluded’” from the United 
States.  STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 411 (4th ed. 2005).  
“Those who were . . . [deemed] ‘deportable,’ and who did not receive discretionary relief, were 
‘deported.’”  Id.  The enactment of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA) changed this vocabulary.  After IIRIRA, “noncitizens who are found either 
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September 6, 2004, after Fernandez-Vargas had been in custody for ten 
months, the government removed him from the United States.5  After 
nearly two decades of residing inside the country,6 Fernandez-Vargas 
ended up where he began: back in Mexico.  His wife and fourteen-year-
old son, both citizens of the United States,7 remained at the family’s 
home in Utah.8 
Fernandez-Vargas was arrested, detained, and summarily removed 
because he had reentered the United States illegally after having 
previously been deported in 1981.9  Specifically, Fernandez-Vargas was 
removed according to the authority granted to the administrative branch 
of government by § 241(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA),10 commonly known as the “reinstatement provision.”11  This 
provision, enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),12 allows the federal 
government to reinstate previous deportation or removal orders against 
aliens who have illegally reentered the United States.13  The provision 
also provides that when prior orders are reinstated, those orders are not 
subject to being reopened or reviewed, and the affected alien is not 
eligible and may not apply for any forms of discretionary relief found 
within the INA.14 
Following his arrest, Fernandez-Vargas appealed for review of his 
prior deportation order’s reinstatement.15  He argued that because he 
illegally reentered the country prior to the IIRIRA’s April 1, 1997 
effective date, the controlling statutory section was the more forgiving, 
pre-IIRIRA provision.16  Unlike § 241(a)(5), this former provision would 
                                                                                                                       
inadmissible or deportable, and who do not receive discretionary relief, are ‘removed’” from the 
United States.  Id.  “This [could] mean either turning them away at the border or evicting them from 
the interior.”  Id.  Prior to IIRIRA, “[t]he proceedings themselves [were] called either ‘exclusion’ or 
‘deportation’ proceedings, depending on whether the person was inadmissible or deportable.”  Id.  
Now, both variations are referred to as “removal” proceedings.  Id.  For the purposes of this Note, 
the terms “deportation” and “removal” can be used interchangeably. 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (No. 04-1376).  Mr. 
Fernandez-Vargas was removed to Juarez, Mexico.  Id. 
 6. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 7. 
 9. Id. at 5–6. 
 10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000). 
 11. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426. 
 12. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 16. Id. 
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have allowed Fernandez-Vargas to apply for discretionary relief from 
removal.17  Because the new reinstatement provision explicitly barred all 
forms of relief that were available to Fernandez-Vargas at the time of his 
reentry, he argued that its application to his case would render an 
impermissible retroactive effect.18 
Citing a split amongst the lower courts, the Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether § 
241(a)(5) controls reinstatement of a removal order when the alien 
illegally reentered prior to the IIRIRA’s effective date.19  In June 2006, 
the Court held that § 241(a)(5) has no impermissible retroactive effect as 
applied to such aliens, and affirmed the removal of Fernandez-Vargas.20  
Now, Fernandez-Vargas, living separated from his family in 
Cuauhtémoc, Mexico,21 is permanently inadmissible and ineligible to 
regularize his immigration status inside the country.22  He may seek a 
waiver of that permanent inadmissibility, but only after spending at least 
ten years outside of the United States.23 
This Note argues that, in limited circumstances, the procedures 
provided for by the current reinstatement provision violate traditional 
notions of due process, an argument not addressed by the Supreme Court 
in Fernandez-Vargas.  However, this Note does not contend that all 
applications of the reinstatement provision offend the Constitution.  
Rather, it argues that under facts similar to those of Fernandez-Vargas—
where a noncitizen is removed following an initial hearing on the merits, 
illegally reenters the country, remains undetected for an extended period 
of time, and subsequently develops new ties and property interests inside 
the United States—the Due Process Clause requires a second hearing in 
order to account for the alien’s change in circumstances.  Because 
Fernandez-Vargas’s 1981 deportation hearing occurred more than twenty 
years before his removal in 2004, reinstatement of the prior deportation 
order without a second hearing was insufficient to protect the property 
and liberty interests he had acquired during his twenty-year stay inside 
                                                     
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B (comparing the former and current reinstatement provisions 
of the INA). 
 18. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2434. 
 21. Dennis Romboy, Deportee Can’t Come Home, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, 
Utah), June 23, 2006, at A01. 
 22. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) 
(2000). 
 23. Id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
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the United States.  Since interests in personal property,24 vehicles,25 real 
property,26 and the relationship between parents and their children27 are 
protectable property interests within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Court’s holding deprived Fernandez-
Vargas of these property interests without due process of law. 
Part II discusses the background of Fernandez-Vargas in greater 
detail.  In addition, Part II outlines both the current deportation 
reinstatement provision, § 241(a)(5), as well as the former reinstatement 
provision in effect at the time of Fernandez-Vargas’s last illegal reentry 
into the United States.  Finally, Part II addresses Congress’s plenary 
power to regulate immigration matters and the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause.  Part III argues that the new reinstatement provision 
offends traditional notions of due process when applied to long-term, 
illegal reentrants, such as Fernandez-Vargas, by depriving these 
individuals of protectable property interests without a fair and impartial 
hearing.  Part III also discusses how separating mixed-status families—
consisting of both U.S. citizen and non-U.S. citizen members—is 
contrary to promoting family unity, and argues that courts could avoid 
this harsh result in cases similar to Fernandez-Vargas by holding that the 
current reinstatement provision violates the Due Process Clause. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Fernandez-Vargas Illegally Reentered the United States in 1981 and 
Remained Undetected for Two Decades 
Fernandez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico, first came to the 
United States as a teenager around 1970.28  During the 1970s and early 
1980s, he was deported several times for immigration violations.29  After 
being deported in 1981, Fernandez-Vargas illegally reentered the country 
in January 198230 and remained undetected by immigration authorities 
for twenty years.31  For the majority of this time, Fernandez-Vargas 
resided in Utah, where he worked as a truck driver and owned his own 
                                                     
 24. Brown v. Knapp, 156 F. Supp. 2d 732, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 25. Robledo v. City of Chi., 444 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 26. United States v. Land, Winston County, 163 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1388–89 
(N.H. 1978), overruled on other grounds by In re Craig T., 800 A.2d 819, 823 (N.H. 2002). 
 28. Romboy, supra note 21. 
 29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 5. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 5–6. 
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trucking business.32  On March 30, 2001, he married his long-term 
girlfriend, Rita Fernandez, a citizen of the United States.33  Several years 
earlier, Rita had given birth to Fernandez-Vargas’s son, Anthony, who is 
also a U.S. citizen.34 
Following his marriage, Fernandez-Vargas took affirmative steps to 
legalize his immigration status inside the country.  Based on a petition 
that Rita had filed on his behalf with the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS),35 Fernandez-Vargas filed two applications that, if 
approved, would allow him to obtain the status of a lawful permanent 
resident inside the United States, despite his previous deportations and 
illegal reentries.36  As part of these filings, the couple paid a $1000 
“penalty” fee to cure Fernandez-Vargas’s illegal entry into the United 
States.37  The INS accepted his applications and authorized his 
employment inside the United States.38  However, these filings 
apparently tipped off federal authorities as to Fernandez-Vargas’s illegal 
reentry into the country.39  In November 2003, the government began 
proceedings under INA § 241(a)(5) that eventually led to the 
reinstatement of Fernandez-Vargas’s 1981 deportation order and his 
removal from the United States.40 
B. The Current Reinstatement Provision Explicitly Denies Relief 
Previously Available Under the Former Provision 
1. Under the Former Deportation Reinstatement Provision, Various 
Forms of Discretionary Relief Were Available to Affected Aliens 
Prior to the current deportation reinstatement provision’s enactment 
in 1996, deportation reinstatement was governed by INA § 242(f).41  This 
former provision read: 
                                                     
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’d sub nom 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006). 
 37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994), amended by Illegal 
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 
3009-607 (1996). 
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Should the Attorney General find that any alien has unlawfully 
reentered the United States after having previously departed or been 
deported pursuant to an order of deportation, whether before or after 
June 27, 1952, . . . the previous order of deportation shall be deemed to 
be reinstated from its original date and such alien shall be deported 
under such previous order at any time subsequent to such reentry.42 
However, despite the provision’s sweeping language, only a limited 
class of unlawful reentrants, such as those deported for aggravated felony 
convictions, were actually affected by the reinstatement order.43  In 
addition, even those unlawful reentrants who were affected by this 
provision could seek some forms of discretionary relief.44  For example, 
under former INA § 244(a)(1), suspension of deportation was available 
to unlawful reentrants who demonstrated continuous presence in the 
United States for a period of seven years, had good moral character, and 
convinced the reviewing body that deportation would result in “extreme 
hardship” to the alien or to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident who was 
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child.45  Moreover, under pre-IIRIRA 
regulations, persons subject to reinstatement of a prior deportation order 
were entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge regarding the 
merits of the reinstatement.46  At this hearing, the person facing 
reinstatement had the right to counsel and the opportunity to develop an 
administrative record.47  The immigration judge’s decision was subject to 
review.48  Finally, a person facing the reinstatement of an earlier 
deportation order could request discretionary relief by seeking to adjust 
his or her status to that of a lawful permanent resident.49 
                                                     
 42. Id. 
 43. Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 887 (10th Cir. 2005), aff’d sub nom 
Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. 2422. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1995), amended by Illegal 
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 
3009-615 (1996). 
 46. 8 C.F.R. § 242.23 (removed 1997); § 242.1(b) (removed 1997). 
 47. § 242.23 (removed 1997); § 242.10 (removed 1997); § 242.15 (removed 1997). 
 48. § 242.23 (removed 1997); § 242.21 (removed 1997). 
 49. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) 
(removed 1997). 
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2. The Current Deportation Reinstatement Provision Denies Any and 
All Forms of Relief Available Under the INA 
President Clinton signed the IIRIRA into law on September 30, 
1996, and it became effective as of April 1, 1997.50  In the IIRIRA, 
Congress replaced the former reinstatement provision with one that toed 
a harder line.  The current deportation reinstatement provision, codified 
at INA § 241(a)(5), reads: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United 
States illegally after having been removed or having departed 
voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is 
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or 
reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief 
under this chapter and the alien shall be removed under the prior order 
at any time after the reentry.51 
INA § 241(a)(5) differs from its predecessor, INA § 242(f), in a 
number of material respects.  First, the current provision expands the 
category of illegal reentrants who may be subjected to reinstatement of a 
previous deportation order.52  Whereas the former provision only 
authorized reinstatement for those who had been deported for certain 
enumerated reasons, § 241(a)(5) authorizes reinstatement of prior 
removal orders for all illegal reentrants previously deported for any 
reason.53  Second, persons subject to reinstatement of a previous order 
are no longer entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge.54  
Instead, a summary administrative procedure may be used in which an 
immigration official, not a judge, makes all the necessary determinations 
concerning the decision to redeport an individual.55  In addition, a person 
facing reinstatement of a prior deportation order may not avoid removal 
by seeking discretionary relief from the Attorney General.56  This final 
difference effectively eliminates the ability of a reentrant to legalize his 
or her status inside the United States once an individual has exited the 
country under an order of removal. 
                                                     
 50. Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. 
C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 51. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000). 
 52. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2426 (2006). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b) (2006). 
 56. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2426. 
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C. The Supreme Court Found Fernandez-Vargas’s Retroactivity 
Argument Unconvincing 
In his petition, Fernandez-Vargas argued that because his illegal 
reentry occurred in 1981, well before the enactment of the IIRIRA, his 
case should be governed by the more-forgiving dictates of pre-IIRIRA 
law.57  Accordingly, Fernandez-Vargas maintained his eligibility to seek 
discretionary relief from removal under INA § 242(f).58  Fernandez-
Vargas argued that § 241(a)(5)’s application would be impermissibly 
retroactive because it “would impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted [or] increase a party’s liability for past conduct” by taking away the 
discretionary relief formerly available under § 242(f).59 
In support of his argument, Fernandez-Vargas relied on three 
observations.  First, the older reinstatement provision contained a 
“before-or-after” clause that expressly gave it retroactive effect, whereas 
Congress removed this clause from the new statute.60  He reasoned that 
had Congress intended for the IIRIRA’s new reinstatement provision to 
apply to reentries that occurred prior to its enactment, Congress would 
have retained this express clause of retroactivity.61  Second, Congress 
had deliberately removed language that expressly gave the provision 
retroactive effect from early drafts of § 241(a)(5).62  Finally, Fernandez-
Vargas argued that because Congress is well aware of the traditional 
presumption against retroactivity, the legislative branches would have 
known to include more specific language if it wanted § 241(a)(5) to 
apply retroactively.63 
On June 22, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an 
eight-to-one decision, held that § 241(a)(5) is not impermissibly 
retroactive when applied to aliens who illegally reentered the country 
before the IIRIRA’s effective date, affirming the summary reinstatement 
of Fernandez-Vargas’s deportation order.64  The Court found that 
Congress’s elimination of the express “before-or-after” clause from the 
current provision did not clearly indicate that Congress intended the law 
                                                     
 57. Id. at 2427. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2427–28. 
 60. Id. at 2429; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 14 (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 
239 F.3d 1037, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 14. 
 62. Id. at 14–15. 
 63. Id. at 15. 
 64. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2434. 
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to apply only to postenactment reentrants.65  The Court noted that the 
point of the statute’s revision was to “expand the scope of the 
reinstatement authority . . . and it would make no sense to infer that 
Congress meant to except [this] broad class of persons.”66  “[Congress 
was] trying to get out of the country people who were here illegally, two-
time losers who were here illegally for the second time.”67  The Court 
concluded that § 241(a)(5) applied not because Fernandez-Vargas 
reentered at any particular time, but because he chose to illegally remain 
in the United States after the new statute became effective.68  The Court 
stated, 
[T]he statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation that the 
alien himself could end at any time by voluntarily leaving the country.  
It is therefore the alien’s choice to continue his illegal presence, after 
illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law, that subjects 
him to the new and less generous legal regime . . . .69 
D. The Political Branches’ Plenary Power to Regulate Immigration 
Matters is Limited by Constitutional Restraints 
Unlike the arguments presented by Fernandez-Vargas, this Note 
focuses on the sufficiency of due process protections provided by the 
current reinstatement provision as applied to Fernandez-Vargas and a 
niche of similarly situated noncitizens—those who illegally reentered the 
country after being removed, remained undetected for an extended period 
of time, and, during this extended period, developed new ties and 
property interests that did not exist at the noncitizen’s first removal 
hearing.  As background to this argument, it should be noted that 
Congress generally has plenary power to regulate matters related to 
immigration.70  The Supreme Court has long recognized that the political 
branches of the federal government are responsible for regulating the 
relationship between the United States and foreign immigrant visitors, 
                                                     
 65. Id. at 2429. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (No. 04-1376) 
(quoting Scalia, J.). 
 68. Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. at 2432. 
 69. Id. 
 70. This doctrine, known as the plenary-power doctrine, simply states that congressional 
authority over immigration matters is “absolute and unchecked.”  Sara A. Martin, Note, Postcards 
from the Border: A Result-Oriented Analysis of Immigration Reform under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 696 (1999). 
BUMGARDNER FINAL.DOC 7/1/2007  7:25:05 PM 
780 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
stating that “‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of 
Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”71  As a 
result, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have consistently 
interpreted the plenary-power doctrine to allow the application of 
congressional rules to noncitizens that would be unconstitutional if 
applied to citizens.72 
However, Congress’s plenary power over immigration-related 
matters is not without limits.  In 1903, the Supreme Court, in Yamataya 
v. Fisher,73 addressed the Legislative Branch’s authority to evict 
noncitizens from the United States.  The Court reviewed an 
administrative finding that a foreign immigrant was deportable on 
grounds that she was a pauper and “likely to become a public charge.”74  
The Court held that a noncitizen who is present in the United States, even 
if present illegally, shall not be “taken into custody and deported without 
giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his 
right to be and remain in the United States.”75  “According to the [] 
Court, the plenary-power doctrine is not a doctrine of absolute power, 
nor is it a means of circumventing the Constitution.  Rather, it is a 
doctrine under which the political branches exercise broad authority, 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.”76 
In 1952, the Court again alluded that Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration was not absolute.  In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,77 the Court 
indicated that any action Congress takes in matters related to 
immigration is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”78  
It has been noted that the Court’s choice of words is significant here.  In 
choosing to say “largely immune” rather than “immune” or “wholly 
immune,” the Court recognized that the plenary power is not absolute.79 
                                                     
 71. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 
U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). 
 72. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power 
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) (upholding racially 
based deportation law directed at Chinese laborers). 
 73. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 74. Id. at 94, 97. 
 75. Id. at 101. 
 76. Trevor Morrison, Note, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens’ Access to 
Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 697, 717 
(1997). 
 77. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 78. Id. at 589 (emphasis added). 
 79. Morrison, supra note 76, at 711 n.83. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. INA § 241(a)(5) Offends Traditional Notions of Due Process Rights 
as Applied to Fernandez-Vargas and Similarly Situated, Long-Term 
Illegal Reentrants 
1. Constitutional Due Process Protections Extend to All ‘Persons’ 
Within the United States 
Traditionally, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution has extended 
its protections to citizens of the United States.  However, on its face, the 
Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”80  In interpreting 
this language, the Supreme Court has held that these provisions are 
universal in their application to all persons within the United States, not 
just citizens, regardless of any differences in race, color, or nationality.81  
Even noncitizens who are unlawfully present in the United States have 
been recognized as “persons” guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.82  In Plyler v. Doe, the Court stated that 
although “a person’s initial entry into . . . the United States, was unlawful 
. . . [this] cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the 
[country’s] territorial perimeter.”83  In 1976, the Court reaffirmed this 
position by again finding that noncitizens who have entered the country, 
either legally or illegally, are entitled to constitutional due process 
protections.84  The Court found that “[t]he Fifth Amendment, as well as 
the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every . . . person[] from deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  Even one whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled 
to that constitutional protection.”85 
2. Fernandez-Vargas is a “Person” Within the Meaning of the Due 
Process Clause 
Although the INA labels Fernandez-Vargas as an “alien” or an 
“illegal,” it does not negate the fact that he is a human; and although he 
                                                     
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 81. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 82. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982). 
 83. Id. at 215. 
 84. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
 85. Id. 
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is not a U.S. citizen, he is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Even though Fernandez-Vargas illegally reentered the 
United States in January of 1982, that fact does not erase his presence 
within the territorial limits of the country.  It follows that Fernandez-
Vargas is entitled to any and all protections provided by the Fifth 
Amendment.  These protections include the right to receive notice and 
the opportunity for a meaningful hearing before being deprived of life, 
liberty, or property.86  Although Fernandez-Vargas did presumably 
receive a “meaningful” hearing at the time of his first deportation, during 
the period he remained in the country undetected, his circumstances 
changed so drastically that his initial deportation hearing, occurring over 
twenty years earlier, no longer can be considered “meaningful.” 
3. Fernandez-Vargas Developed Several Protectable Property Interests  
In order to state a claim for a violation of due process, a person must 
show a cognizable property or liberty interest and show a deprivation of 
that interest without due process.87  Cognizable property interests are not 
created by the Constitution.88  “Rather they are created and . . . defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits 
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”89  Courts have 
found that persons have a protectable property interest in their vehicles 
and other personal property.90  In addition, the Supreme Court has found 
that personal residences, as well as all real property, are protectable 
property interests and require notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before a deprivation may occur.91 
During the twenty-year period following Fernandez-Vargas’s illegal 
reentry, he developed several protectable property interests within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause.  Fernandez-Vargas’s last deportation 
occurred in 1981; he reentered the country the following year, and then 
                                                     
 86. See United States v. Land, Winston County, 163 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government deprives 
them of real property). 
 87. Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 88. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that a 
person’s car is property and is therefore protectable within the meaning of the Due Process Clause); 
Brown v. Knapp, 156 F. Supp. 2d 732, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of personal property . . . .”). 
 91. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993). 
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spent the next twenty years living and working inside the United States.  
During this time, he developed substantial ties to the country.  In 
particular, Fernandez-Vargas established a business and purchased a 
small home in Utah.  In association with his business, he owned two 
semitrucks, as well as other equipment.92  When Fernandez-Vargas was 
summarily deported, he was deprived of these personal and real property 
interests without the benefit of a meaningful hearing.  Because his first 
deportation hearing occurred before Fernandez-Vargas acquired this 
property, it did not provide the due process protections mandated by the 
Fifth Amendment. 
The Court has also noted that the “property interests protected by 
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real 
estate, chattels, or money.”93  In addition to these tangible forms of 
property, courts have recognized that individuals may possess other 
intangible property rights and liberty interests.  For example, the 
Supreme Court has held that the relationship between a parent and a 
child is constitutionally protected.94  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court reiterated that “‘[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .’  And it is now firmly 
established that ‘freedom . . . in matters of . . . family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .’”95  Other courts have 
also commented on the elevated status of parental-child relationships.  In 
State v. Robert H.,96 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that 
“[t]he role of parents in the life of a family has attained the status of a 
fundamental human right and liberty.”97 
Although the Court in Quilloin v. Walcott was addressing whether a 
father could block the adoption of his illegitimate child,98 the same 
fundamental principles articulated by the Court should apply to other 
parent-child relationships.  Similarly, although the court in Robert H. 
dealt specifically with custody issues,99 its characterization of the nature 
of a parent’s role in a child’s life as a “fundamental human right and 
liberty”100 should not be limited solely to this context.  The issues raised 
                                                     
 92. Romboy, supra note 2. 
 93. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72. 
 94. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
 95. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–46 (1974)). 
 96. 393 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1978), overruled on other grounds by In re Craig T., 800 A.2d 819 
(N.H. 2002). 
 97. Id. at 1388. 
 98. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247. 
 99. Robert H., 393 A.2d at 1387–88. 
 100. Id. at 1388. 
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in adoption and custody cases are closely analogous to family issues 
raised in some reinstatement cases—specifically, where an illegal 
reentrant returns to the United States, marries a U.S. citizen, and fathers 
or gives birth to a U.S.-citizen child.  In each context, decisions are made 
that will affect the fundamental relationship between a parent and his or 
her child.  In the deportation context, if the noncitizen parent is 
summarily removed from the United States without a meaningful 
hearing, that parent is also being summarily removed from the child’s 
life without an opportunity to keep the family unit together by seeking 
discretionary relief.  Summarily removing such illegal reentrants either 
deprives the noncitizen of a fundamental liberty interest without due 
process, or effectively deports the U.S.-citizen spouse and child if they 
choose to leave the United States and follow the removed noncitizen. 
While no court has followed the exact logic outlined above 
concerning the parent-child relationships of reentrants, the Supreme 
Court has addressed similar issues in the context of a lawful permanent 
resident.  In 1982, the Court recognized that “once an alien gains 
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with 
permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly,”101 as 
these ties entitle the alien to an increased level of due process.102  
Although the subject of deportation in Landon v. Plasencia was a legal 
permanent resident, the logic used by the Court is applicable to 
Fernandez-Vargas.  In Landon, the Court identified the petitioner’s rights 
“to stay and live and work” as “weighty.”103  The Court also recognized 
the right of a noncitizen to “rejoin her immediate family” as a protectable 
interest and one that “ranks high among the interests of the 
individual.”104  A noncitizen, whether legally or illegally present in the 
country, may develop similar ties over an extended period of time.  
Because Fernandez-Vargas was present inside the United States for 
twenty years, he developed strong family and community bonds which 
should be viewed as cognizable property and liberty interests within the 
scope of the Due Process Clause. 
                                                     
 101. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 34. 
 104. Id. 
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4. The Current Reinstatement Procedures Failed to Provide Fernandez-
Vargas with Adequate Constitutional Protections Before Depriving 
Him of Protectable Property and Liberty Interests 
Despite the fact that the plenary-power doctrine confers considerable 
discretion over immigration matters to the political branches of 
government, this power is not exercised without constraints.105  Instead, 
the Constitution limits expressions of the plenary power, and it remains 
the judiciary’s role to enforce these limitations.106  Therefore, it is the 
duty of the judiciary to ensure that the political branches do not abrogate 
the constitutional rights vested in noncitizens.  Where a statutory 
provision exceeds its constitutional authority, it should be declared 
invalid.107 
Under the current reinstatement regulations, in order to reinstate a 
prior order of removal, an immigration officer must determine: (1) 
whether the noncitizen has been subject to the prior order of removal; (2) 
the identity of the noncitizen; and (3) whether the noncitizen unlawfully 
reentered the United States (based on all relevant evidence, including any 
statements made by the noncitizen).108  When an immigration officer 
determines that a noncitizen is subject to removal under 8 C.F.R. § 
241.8, the officer must advise the noncitizen that he can make a written 
or oral statement contesting the determination.109  If the noncitizen makes 
a statement, the officer is directed to consider whether the statement 
warrants reconsideration of the determination.110  If the officer remains 
convinced that the noncitizen is subject to removal, the noncitizen shall 
be removed under the previous order of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal without further hearing.111  These reinstatement orders are 
issued by low-level immigration officers, not immigration judges.112  The 
orders are often executed within hours or days.113  Once an order is 
                                                     
 105. Morrison, supra note 76, at 718. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2853 (2006), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 985 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 108. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2006).  But see Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 247, 253 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2005) (noting that the regulation was found unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit in a 2004 decision 
that was later overturned en banc). 
 109. § 241.8(b). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § 241.8(c). 
 112. TRINA REALMUTO, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION, PRACTICE ADVISORY, 
REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL 2 (2006), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/reinstatment.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
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issued, it is not subject to being opened or reviewed by a judicial 
officer.114  Any noncitizen subject to the reinstatement provision is “not 
eligible and may not apply for any relief” under the INA.115 
To date, no court has found that the current reinstatement statute or 
regulations violate due process requirements.116  In fact, most courts that 
have directly addressed the issue determined that the current 
reinstatement of removal procedures under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.117  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because 
reentrants must have one full and fair hearing prior to being initially 
removed, a reinstatement order satisfies due process as long as the 
underlying deportation or removal proceeding itself satisfied due 
process.118 
However, none of these courts have reached this conclusion while 
addressing circumstances similar to those in Fernandez-Vargas.  In fact, 
courts that have found the provision to be valid have all examined its 
constitutionality as applied to reentrants who were present in the country 
for relatively short periods of time prior to being detected by 
immigration authorities.  None of those illegal reentrants had established 
families or other significant ties to the United States.  In those situations, 
the initial removal proceeding—consisting of a full hearing before an 
impartial adjudicator, including the opportunity to present evidence and 
develop an administrative record—was sufficient to satisfy due process 
demands; the initial removal hearing was held only a few years prior to 
reinstatement and the reentrant’s circumstances had not materially 
changed since the initial hearing.  However, where a reentrant’s 
circumstances have materially changed and the initial hearing has 
become stale, due process requirements demand that a reentrant facing 
reinstatement receive a second hearing. 
Although no courts have held that INA § 241(a)(5) violates the Due 
Process Clause, several courts have expressed doubts about the 
constitutionality of current reinstatement procedures.119  In Castro-Cortez 
v. INS, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he reinstatement 
                                                     
 114. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000). 
 115. Id. 
 116. REALMUTO, supra note 112, at 16. 
 117. E.g., Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846–48 (8th Cir. 2006); Arreola-Arreola v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2004); Warner v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 534, 538–39 (6th Cir. 
2004); Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Ashcroft, 271 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 118. Arreola-Arreola, 383 F.3d at 963. 
 119. Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004); Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 
F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2002); Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 675–76 (6th Cir. 2001); Castro-Cortez 
v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047–50 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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process raises very serious due process concerns.”120  The court stated 
that under the revised reinstatement provision, basic procedural 
safeguards had been eliminated and replaced with a summary process in 
which an Immigration Officer makes relevant determinations.121  The 
court expressed “serious doubt whether the use of Immigration Officers 
to determine whether to reinstate removal orders comports with due 
process.”122  Finally, the court noted that aliens subject to reinstatement 
were denied fundamental due process rights, including the opportunity to 
appear before an impartial decisionmaker, the right to obtain counsel, 
and the right to receive a full and fair hearing.123  The Ninth Circuit, 
while expressing serious doubts as to the reinstatement procedures’ 
constitutionality, did not decide the issue and instead ruled in favor of the 
petitioning party on a narrower ground.124  Additionally, at oral argument 
for Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,125 Justice Scalia briefly addressed the 
possibility of due process concerns, stating “whether it’s fair or not is 
something we can inquire into under the due process clause.”126  
However, counsel for Fernandez-Vargas chose not to raise these issues, 
and instead focused his efforts on arguing that the reinstatement 
provision had an impermissible retroactive effect when applied to his 
client.127 
An analysis of whether the reinstatement provisions were 
constitutionally valid as applied to Fernandez-Vargas would have used 
the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. 
Eldridge.128  This test weighs the following factors: (1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards”; and (3) the government’s interest, including “fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedure[s] . . . 
would entail.”129 
Under the first prong of the Mathews test, the private interests at 
stake were considerable.  During his twenty-year presence inside the 
                                                     
 120. Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1048. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1049. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1050. 
 125. 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006). 
 126. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S. Ct. 2422 (No. 04-1376). 
 127. Id. at 6–8. 
 128. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 129. Id. at 335. 
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United States, Fernandez-Vargas acquired significant protectable 
property interests, including various items of personal property, 
equipment used in his business, and a personal residence.  Fernandez-
Vargas also married a U.S. citizen and fathered a son. 
Moving to the second prong of the Mathews test, the reinstatement 
procedures under INA § 241(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 allow use of a 
summary removal process and deny the opportunity for a second hearing.  
While this process may not pose a great risk of erroneous deprivation 
when applied to some illegal reentrants—namely, noncitizens who have 
not developed new property or liberty interests following their illegal 
reentry into the country—the risk is substantially higher where a 
reentrant remains in the United States long enough to establish new ties 
to community and family.  In such situations, it is paramount that the 
noncitizen facing a deprivation of new property or liberty interests be 
allowed a second hearing before a prior removal order is reinstated.  As 
applied to Fernandez-Vargas, the summary reinstatement procedures 
deprived him of his personal property, real property, and family without 
any of the procedural protections traditionally required by the Due 
Process Clause. 
The final prong of the Mathews test examines the government’s 
interest in currently used procedures.  The government’s main interest in 
maintaining the current reinstatement process is related to efficiency.  
Over the past generation, annual levels of immigration have tripled.130  
Current estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants inside the 
United States range from seven million to thirteen million people.131  In 
2005 alone, removal hearings resulted in the removal of 208,521 persons, 
of whom 18,203 were removed under INA § 241(a)(5)’s reinstatement 
provision.132  Based on these figures, the government has a significant 
interest in streamlining the removal process.  Removal hearings consume 
time, cost money, and increase administrative burdens.  The government 
has a legitimate interest in minimizing the consumption of these 
                                                     
 130. MICHAEL FIX, WENDY ZIMMERMAN & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN INST., THE 
INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2001), available at 
http://www.urban.org/publications/410227.html. 
 131. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
1990 TO 2000 1, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 
Ill_Report_1211.pdf; Federation for American Immigration Reform, How Many Illegal Aliens?, 
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Mar. 
31, 2007). 
 132. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2005 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 96 tbl.40 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf. 
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resources, and where an illegal reentrant has already benefited from a full 
hearing, it does not shock the conscience, in most cases, to avoid 
duplicative expenditures where adequate due process has already been 
provided. 
However, in a minority of cases, additional procedural protections 
are required by the Constitution.  Courts have recognized that “[D]ue 
Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.”133  Courts have also held that the nature of 
protection owed to a reentrant can vary, depending on circumstances and 
the facts of his case.134  Given the extraordinary facts surrounding 
Fernandez-Vargas’s reentry and residence in the United States, the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause demand that he—and other 
similarly situated reentrants—be provided with a second full hearing 
before being deprived of protectable liberty or property interests.  
Therefore, because the provisions of INA § 241(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 
241.8 fail to provide Fernandez-Vargas with sufficient constitutional 
protection, these provisions should be declared unconstitutional, or at a 
minimum, be limited in their application to short-term reentrants. 
The fiscal and administrative burdens that a second hearing would 
require in cases similar to Fernandez-Vargas are minimal.  The 
government already provides noncitizens facing an initial removal with a 
full hearing before an immigration judge.  Illegal reentrants facing 
reinstatement could appear before the same judges and in the same 
tribunals.  No new mechanisms would be required to accommodate this 
additional procedure.  Second hearings should only be provided to illegal 
reentrants whose circumstances have materially changed to the extent 
that their first hearing is no longer sufficient to ensure adequate 
procedural due process protections.  The number of long-term reentrants, 
such as Fernandez-Vargas, who would qualify for a second hearing 
would constitute only a fraction of the illegal reentrants removed under 
the reinstatement provision on an annual basis. 
Immigration officers would screen illegal reentrants on a case-by-
case basis to see if they possibly qualified for a second hearing.  When 
an illegal reentrant is taken into custody, the burden of proof would be on 
the noncitizen to provide prima facie evidence of his or her material 
change in circumstance.  Prima facie evidence would include, but not be 
limited to, evidence of when the noncitizen reentered the country, a 
                                                     
 133. Khan v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 481 (1972)) (alteration in original). 
 134. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693–94 (2001). 
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legitimate marriage to a U.S. citizen, giving birth to or fathering a U.S.-
citizen child, and accumulated assets, such as personal or real property.  
If the noncitizen has resided in the country for an extended period, 
established a family, or accumulated property, then the reentrant should 
be able to document these facts.  Reentrants who are unable to establish a 
prima facie case would be governed by current removal provisions and 
would not be afforded a second hearing.  Reentrants who are identified 
as potentially qualifying for a second hearing would be forwarded to an 
immigration judge for a final determination.  If the immigration judge 
determines that the noncitizen has established protectable interests since 
last being removed, then the noncitizen would be provided with a second 
hearing on the merits, and would be allowed to seek discretionary relief 
from removal under the INA.  Where the immigration judge makes an 
adverse determination, the affected reentrant should be allowed to appeal 
the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the federal court 
system, if necessary. 
Likewise, this additional procedure would not seriously offend any 
public policy.  The procedure would only benefit a select group of 
reentrants.  Despite their illegal entries into the country and continuing 
unlawful presence, if reentrants have made significant ties to their 
communities and wish to remain in the United States, they should be 
given the opportunity to do so by lawful means. 
B. Finding that Current Reinstatement Provisions Violate the Due 
Process Clause Would Promote Family Unity by Keeping Mixed-
Status Families of Long-Term Illegal Reentrants Together 
1. Recent Immigration Laws Have Negatively Impacted Mixed-Status 
Families 
United States immigration laws have long promoted family unity as 
a central value.135  “The legislative history of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress intended to provide 
for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of 
keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united.”136  In 
fact, during 2005, of 738,302 total immigrants admitted to the country as  
 
                                                     
 135. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 250 (noting that “one central value that United States 
immigration laws have long promoted, albeit to varying degrees, is family unity”). 
 136. H.R. Rep. No. 85-1199, at 7 (1957), as reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016, 2020. 
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lawful permanent residents, 337,310 were admitted based on family 
relationships to other U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.137 
However, despite this noble purpose, recent immigration laws, 
including INA § 241(a)(5), have undermined these family values.138  
When noncitizens are removed, lives are uprooted.  Removed 
noncitizens often lose everything, including their families, friends, 
community, jobs, and religious freedom.139  Removal also affects those 
left behind, often U.S. citizens, by banishing their loved ones, tearing 
families apart, and eliminating economic support the deported individual 
provided.  For example, in late 2005, Fernandez-Vargas’s wife, Rita, 
almost lost the house she and her husband had purchased together.140  
“Months behind in her mortgage,” Rita was forced to sell many home 
furnishings, while the couple’s son sold his Nintendo, television, 
computer, and Game Boy at yard sales—all in an effort to keep their 
home—before three donors graciously paid off the mortgage.141 
In the alternative, spouses and children may be forced to leave the 
United States when an individual is summarily removed from the 
country.142  In March 2006, Rita Fernandez described the effect her 
husband’s removal has had on their family, saying “What about me?  
What about us?  What about our family?  Do we leave the United States 
and live in Mexico, a country we don’t know?”143  Such dilemmas are 
common in the context of removal proceedings, sparking one 
commentator to note that “in practice, U.S. citizen children born of alien 
parents in the United States are easily deportable.”144 
                                                     
 137. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 132, at 18 tbl.6 (noting that 266,851 
were immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and 70,459 were family-sponsored preferences). 
 138. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1951 (2000) (discussing some of the 
consequences of the INA). 
 139. See Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions 
of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 
VILL. L. REV. 725, 763 (1996) (arguing that community ties aliens make while residing in another 
country should be used as a basis for determining when deportation exceptions should be made). 
 140. See Dennis Romboy, Yes! Home for Christmas: 3 Donors Pay Off Mortgage for Wife of 
Deported Man, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Dec. 22, 2005, at A01 (“Three 
anonymous donors stepped in to pay off the mortgage . . . .”). 
 141. Romboy, supra note 2. 
 142. See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of 
Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 67 (2005) (noting 
that “children of deported parents commonly leave the country with their parents”). 
 143. Dennis Romboy, Justices Weighing Deportation Case, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt 
Lake City, Utah), Mar. 23, 2006, at A01. 
 144. Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and 
International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 15 n.43 (2001). 
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2. As Applied to Certain Long-Term Reentrants, a Finding that INA § 
241(a)(5) Violates the Due Process Clause is Good Public Policy 
As the United States increasingly becomes home to a long-term, 
undocumented population, it is not surprising that members of this 
population marry and have children.  The creation and persistence of 
these mixed-status families is heavily impacted by high immigration 
levels and harsh immigration laws.145  Undocumented noncitizens with 
no means of achieving legal immigration status often form families with 
persons who already have legal immigration status or citizenship.146  
Further complicating this issue, children born in the United States are 
U.S. citizens at birth, regardless of the status of their parents.147  “The 
formation of family ties between undocumented immigrants and persons 
with legal immigration status in turn influences the decisions of 
undocumented immigrants to remain in this country.”148  “[Of] families 
with children and headed by a noncitizen, eighty-five percent are mixed-
status families.”149 
Keeping this statistic in mind, the Fernandez-Vargas holding makes 
bad public policy for two key reasons.  First, of the undocumented 
immigrant population, it is likely that thousands of families face 
circumstances similar to those faced by Fernandez-Vargas.  The Court’s 
holding applies § 241(a)(5) to persons whose most recent removal and 
illegal reentry occurred before the IIRIRA’s effective date, over ten years 
ago.  Such noncitizens have likely established binding ties to the country, 
including ties to family, community, and property.  Second, because the 
new reinstatement provision eliminates any possible relief from removal, 
it has the practical effect of encouraging noncompliance with the law; 
illegal immigrants will remain hidden inside the United States because 
they do not want to alert the government to their illegal presence by 
risking a border crossing or by submitting paperwork to legalize their 
status.  The Court’s ruling tells illegal reentrants there is no way for them 
to achieve legal status inside the country, sending them into hiding and 
increasing the number of undocumented immigrants living inside the 
United States. 
                                                     
 145. See Thronson, supra note 142, at 52 (“[T]oday’s undocumented population is notable for 
both its lack of prospects for legalization under current law and its relative stability.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 148. Thronson, supra note 142, at 52. 
 149. Id.; see also FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 130, at 15 (discussing the 
predominance of mixed-status families). 
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In the end, persons who could have been incorporated into our 
nation’s economy as productive “legal” members of society will remain 
foreigners in a land they call home.  Likewise, unlawful immigrants 
affected by the Fernandez-Vargas ruling often have families in the 
United States, many of which are mixed-status families.  When a 
noncitizen parent’s deportation order is reinstated, these families will be 
forced to deal with the loss of a loved one.  These families must then 
suffer either separation or relocation to a foreign and unfamiliar country.  
Either resolution seems a harsh result and is contrary to the value of 
promoting family unity.  However, this result could be avoided if courts 
determined that INA § 241(a)(5), as applied to noncitizens who have 
established new property and liberty interests in the United States since 
illegally reentering, violates the Due Process Clause, and that a second 
hearing is required in lieu of summarily depriving these reentrants of 
protectable interests. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The prior version of the reinstatement statute afforded illegal 
reentrants facing removal several forms of relief no longer available in § 
241(a)(5).  When Congress passed the IIRIRA in 1996, it replaced the 
former section with a much harsher provision.  Under § 241(a)(5), 
Congress expanded the category of illegal reentrants subject to 
reinstatement, removed entitlement to a second full hearing before an 
immigration judge, and eliminated all discretionary relief once available 
from the Attorney General. 
On June 22, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in Fernandez-Vargas v. 
Gonzales that the new reinstatement provision applied to an illegal 
reentrant whose former deportation order was issued in 1981 and who 
last illegally reentered the United States in 1982.  Despite the fact that 
Fernandez-Vargas had spent the past twenty years inside the country, 
residing primarily in Utah, the Court held that his continued illegal 
presence in the country triggered the application of the current and less-
forgiving reinstatement provision.  As a result, his summary removal 
from the country was affirmed, and he is barred from reentering the 
United States to join his wife and child for at least ten years. 
Although Fernandez-Vargas has foreclosed challenges of 
impermissible retroactive effect, there still remains a viable challenge to 
the constitutionality of INA § 241(a)(5) and its implementing regulation, 
8 C.F.R § 241.8, based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Under the Due Process Clause, all persons are entitled to 
due process of law before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.  As 
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applied in Fernandez-Vargas, the new reinstatement provisions violate 
this constitutional mandate.  Because Fernandez-Vargas’s circumstances 
had materially changed since his 1981 deportation order—he had 
acquired personal property, real property, married a U.S. citizen, and 
fathered a son, also a U.S. citizen—due process required that the 
government provide him with a second full and fair hearing before 
removing him from the country and depriving him of these protectable 
property and liberty interests.  Providing similarly situated reentrants 
with a second hearing would consume a minimum of additional 
resources because the mechanics to administer the hearings are already in 
place.  Likewise, allowing a second hearing in these limited 
circumstances helps keep certain mixed-status families together.  Not 
only is this result good public policy, but it also promotes a central value 
of U.S. immigration law—family unity. 
 
